Constitutional Law--Due Process--Failure to Insulate Criminal Trial from Prejudicial Publicity Deemed a Denial of Due Process (Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966)) by St. John\u27s Law Review
St. John's Law Review 
Volume 41 
Number 3 Volume 41, January 1967, Number 3 Article 8 
April 2013 
Constitutional Law--Due Process--Failure to Insulate Criminal Trial 
from Prejudicial Publicity Deemed a Denial of Due Process 
(Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966)) 
St. John's Law Review 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
St. John's Law Review (1967) "Constitutional Law--Due Process--Failure to Insulate Criminal Trial from 
Prejudicial Publicity Deemed a Denial of Due Process (Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966))," St. 
John's Law Review: Vol. 41 : No. 3 , Article 8. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview/vol41/iss3/8 
This Recent Development in New York Law is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's 
Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of 
St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
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session-to-session. In this way, the effectiveness of the Committee
can be immediately established without the necessity of further
judicial decisions. Such a procedure would also eliminate any
controversy between the judiciary and the legislature. With the
power of contempt firmly restored, HUAC would then be able
effectively to fulfill its designated purpose, i.e., to conduct investi-
gations essential to the formulation of laws.
X
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw - DUE PRocEss - FAILURE TO IN-
SULATE CRIMINAL TRIAL FROM PREJUDICIAL PUmLiciTY DEEMED A
DENIAL OF DUE PRocEss. - Petitioner Sheppard was tried and
convicted in an Ohio court of second degree murder. Prior to
and throughout the course of the trial petitioner was the subject
of extensive publicity which focused heavily on matters unfavorable
to him. No evidence concerning these matters was ever intro-
duced at the trial. The trial court refused to take steps to
restrict the activities of the news media in gathering material
during the course of the trial, and denied petitioner's request to
poll the jury to determine its exposure to such publicity. On
certiorari, the Supreme Court of the United States voided pe-
titioner's conviction and held that the failure of the trial court to
insulate petitioner's trial from pervasive and prejudicial publicity
together with a disruptive courtroom environment deprived him
of the fair and impartial trial guaranteed by the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment. Sheppard v. Mazwel, 384 U.S. 333
(1966).
It has long been a principle of Anglo-American criminal justice
that a person accused of a crime be afforded a public trial.1 In the
United States, this guarantee is embodied in the sixth amendment
of the Constitution: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial
jury. . .. " 2 This guarantee has been made applicable to state
courts through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment 3
Its purpose has been stated to be that of serving "as a safeguard
against any attempt to employ our courts as instruments of perse-
cution," 4 by insuring that the accused's trial will be open to members
of the family and other interested parties rather than merely to
I See Note, Televising Tudicial Proceedings-A Denial of Due Process?,
11 CATHoLC LAw. 331 (1965).
2 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
; See In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948).
4Id. at 270,
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"officials." 5 Likewise, the first amendment guarantee that "Congress
shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press ... "6 is regarded as one of the most fundamental rights
guaranteed by the Constitution.? It is subject to limitation only
to prevent evils, the potential consequences of which present such
a "clear and present danger" that they outweigh the maintenance
of this freedom.8 This practice of "balancing" apparently con-
flicting interests is indicated in the Supreme Court's statement that
"freedom of discussion should be given the widest range compatible
with the essential requirement of the fair and orderly administration
of justice." 9
The emphatic recognition of freedom of the press, and the
equally important protection afforded an accused under the sixth
amendment provide the environment for the current controversy
concerning publicity and criminal trials. In the past, the Supreme
Court has been reluctant to restrain the freedom of the news media
in publicizing judicial proceedings, and even more reluctant to
impose penalties for alleged excesses in the exercise of this
freedom. In Bridges v. California,' the petitioners had been con-
victed of contempt for the publication of newspaper stories and
editorials concerning pending criminal trials. The trial court had
found that such publications "tended" to interfere with the orderly
administration of justice.11 The Court rejected the application
of the "tendency" test and asserted that the contempt penalty should
be imposed only within the guidelines of the "clear and present
danger" test.1 2 Under the latter test, freedom of the press is to be
given the widest possible scope, and restraint is permissible only in
the face of an unmistakably serious probability that the substantive
evil legitimately sought to be prevented will occur.13
This freedom, however, does not exist in a vacuum. The
Court has pointed out that there are strong countervailing interests
which must be recognized, especially in criminal trials: "With his
life at stake, it is not requiring too much that petitioner be tried
in an atmosphere undisturbed by .. . a wave of public passion"14
which may be occasioned by extensive publicity. While the Court
5 Douglas, The Public Trial and the Free Press, 33 RocKY MT. L. Rmz.
1, 5 (1960).
,U.S. CoirsT. amend. I.
7 See Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U.L. REv. 865, 874 (1960).
8 See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1956) ; Dennis v. United
States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S.
568 (1942).
9 Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 347 (1945).
10 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
1 Id. at 272.
a Id. at 263.
23 Ibid.
"4 Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 728 (1961).
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has given recognition to the conflicting values of free press and
fair trial, it has chosen to deal with the conflict by remedying
the ill effects of publicity on the accused through the use of
procedural safeguards, rather than through direct restraints on the
press.' 5 By implication, it seems that the Court has found pro-
cedures such as the granting of new trials 16 and the use of motions
for continuances and changes of venue 1.7 preferable to restraints
upon the source of the information which gives rise to the
prejudicial atmosphere involved.
As a result of the Court's reluctance to place restraints on
freedom of the press, petitioners who claim they have been denied
due process have generally been required to shoulder a heavy burden
in demonstrating the actual prejudicial effect of such publicity. To
uphold such a claim, a petitioner must show that his trial "was
'fatally infected' with an absence of 'that fundamental fairness
essential to the very concept of justice' ,;18 that such matters
"aroused against him such prejudice in the community as to
'necessarily prevent a fair trial'"; '9 or that there existed in the
trial community a "pattern of deep and bitter prejudice." 20 The
Court has stated the above tests to be generally applicable to cases
involving claims of due process violation.2
Nevertheless, the Court has indicated that there are instances
in which the generally applied tests should give way to a less
stringent method of determining denial of due process, i.e., the
totality of circumstances may be a sufficient foundation for a finding
of prejudice despite an inability to pinpoint the specific source or
impact of such prejudice.2 2  For example, in Marshall v. United
States, 3 the Court reversed a conviction in a narcotics case because
of the jury's exposure to newspaper articles which focused on
matters in petitioner's past which were prejudicial to him. The
conviction was reversed even though the jurors, when examined,
assured the trial court of their ability to discount such publicity
and maintain their impartiality.24  In Rideau v. Louisiana,25 pe-
titioner's interrogation and confession were repeatedly televised
throughout the locale of his trial. The Court reversed his con-
15 For a critical evaluation of the efficacy of these devices, see Goldfarb,
Public Information, Criminal Trials and the Cause Celebre, 36 N.Y.U.L. REv.
810, 818-24 (1961).
10 Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310 (1959).
17 Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
18 Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181, 191-92 (1952).
'5 Id. at 193.
20 Supra note 17, at 727.
21 Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 541-44 (1965).
22 Id. at 544.
23 Supra note 16.
24 Id. at 312.
25373 U.S. 723 (1963).
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viction and stated that, even without examining the voir dire,
they could decide that the publicity involved was prejudicial per se.28
Thus, the petitioner was not obliged to show that a single juror
was actually influenced by such publicity in a manner adverse to
petitioner's right to a fair trial. The very circumstances of the
publicity, apart from any demonstrable effect, were sufficient to
support a claim of denial of due process.2 7
Soon after the decision in Rideau, the Court reviewed the
conviction of Billie Sol Estes, whose activities were extremely
well-publicized, and restated this less stringent "probability of
prejudice" or "inherently prejudicial" test.28 In that case, over
his objection, the petitioner's pretrial hearing on a motion for a
change of venue and his later trial were televised. The Court
held that the widespread notoriety attendant upon such coverage
was inherently unfair to petitioner because of its potential prejudicial
effect on jurors, witnesses and judges, without any showing that
such potential effects became actualities at the trial.2 9
In the instant case,30 Dr. Sheppard was convicted of murder
in the second degree. During the period between his arrest and
the beginning of his trial a great volume of virulent and ac-
cusatory publicity was given the case by local and national news
media.31 A three-day inquest into the circumstances surrounding
the murder was held in a gymnasium before several hundred
spectators and was viewed on television by countless others. 32
Prior to the trial the names and addresses of prospective jurors
were published and, as a result, they received numerous letters
and telephone calls concerning the case. 33 The prosecutor made
pretrial statements concerning petitioner's family's alleged lack
of cooperation with the investigating authorities.34  The press was
assigned space not only throughout the gallery but even within
the bar of the court, in such proximity to petitioner and his counsel
that confidential conversation was hampered. 35 The verbatim record
2Gid. at 727.
271bid. See Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466 (1965), wherein the
Court reversed a conviction even though the petitioner could show no
identifiable, tangible instance of prejudice. The Court admitted that
petitioner had shown that no actual prejudice resulted from the association
of the jury and two key prosecution witnesses. But, it nevertheless stated
that it would be naive to overlook the extreme prejudice inherent in the
association.
23 Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965).29 Id. at 544.
30 Sheppard v. Maxavell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
31 For a large selection of press clippings concerning the trial, see
Sheppard v. Maxwell, 231 F.Supp. 37, 44-57 (S.D. Ohio 1965).
32 Supra note 30, at 339-40.
33 Id. at 342.
34 Id. at 338.
35 Id. at 344-45.
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of each day's proceedings was available to the press and, through
publication, to prospective witnesses. 8 The trial court refused, on
several occasions, to poll the jury as to its exposure to particular
instances of prejudicial publicity during the course of the trial.3
The trial court also refused to grant motions for continuances
or a change of venue.-
In its opinion, the Court emphasized that these facts were
the basis for determining whether petitioner's claim of due process
violations should be sustained. While admitting the general rule
that petitioner must demonstrate the presence of "identifiable"
prejudice at his trial, the Court, nevertheless, pointed to the
precedents of Rideau and Estes to support the conclusion that
the totality of circumstances may warrant the application of the
less stringent "probability of prejudice" and "inherently prejudicial"
tests.39 Comparing the instant case with Estes, the Court declared:
Unlike Estes, Sheppard was not granted a change of venue to a locale away
from where the publicity originated; nor was his jury sequestered. The
Estes jury saw none of the television broadcasts from the courtroom. On
the contrary, the Sheppard jurors were subjected to newspaper, radio and
television coverage of the trial while not taking part in the proceedings ...
The press coverage of the Estes trial was not nearly as massive and
pervasive as the attention given by the Cleveland newspapers and broadcasting
stations to Sheppard's prosecution 40
It was reasoned that the "totality of circumstances" giving rise to
a "probability of prejudice," was clearly applicable to the facts
in Sheppard. Although the trial court's failure to act with regard
to pretrial publicity was not considered in itself to be such a denial
of due process as to warrant a reversal, nevertheless, such pretrial
publicity was a major factor against which the trial court's later
rulings on defense motions were to be viewed. The Court further
found that the trial court had not exercised appropriate physical
control over the courtroom. Such control, if exercised, would
have been sufficient to guarantee the petitioner a fair trial, and
thus, would have made it unnecessary, in the Court's view, to
inquire into possible sanctions that could have been imposed directly
upon a recalcitrant press. The opinion indicated several steps
which the trial court should have taken: (1) strict regulation of
the presence and activities of the media representatives in the court-
room, especially their exclusion from within the bar of the court;
(2) insulation of witnesses from the news media; (3) strict
3s Ibid. The record of the proceedings was published in various newspapers
and national magazines, and reported on radio and television.3
7 Id. at 357.
as Id. at 347, 352.
s9 Supra note 28, at 542-43.40 Supra note 30, at 352-54.
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enforcement of a prohibition against court officers and prosecutors
divulging non-record information to news media; and (4) the
use of procedural safeguards such as continuances and changes
of venue if it appeared that, despite the use of the foregoing
methods of control, the probability of prejudice still remained.41
Thus, "given the pervasiveness of modem communications and the
difficulty of effacing prejudicial publicity from the minds of the
jurors, the trial courts must take strong measures to insure that
the balance is never weighed against the accused." 42
In examining the significance of the instant case, there are
several factors which should be noted. First, since the Court
chose not to deal with the issue of possible direct restrictions
on the press in a case which would seem factually conducive to
such treatment, it seems clear that the Court regards such direct
restrictions as an undesirable means for solving the problem of
press influence on criminal trials. Rather, the Sheppard opinion
is insistent in its demand that trial courts make full and effective
use of their inherent power over officers of the court, witnesses,
and jurors, in order to insulate an accused from the effects of
extraneous and prejudicial influences in the conduct of his trial.
The Court indicated the devices available to the trial court for
accomplishing this end. Some of these devices are routine-con-
tinuances, changes of venue, sequestration of the jury.43 Of greater
significance is the Court's discussion of the trial court's ability to
control the sources of information. The trial court had direct
control over lawyers, witnesses, and court officials, the chief sources
from which the press derived its information.4 It could have
proscribed extrajudicial statements by those persons, and it
could have asked for the promulgation of regulations by local
authorities prohibiting their employees from making such state-
ments. 4  The brunt of the Court's decision clearly falls upon the
trial court and demands that that court, sua sponte if necessary,
invoke all of its inherent powers to negate any detrimental influence
upon the fair determination of the accused's guilt. Thus, very
clearly, the Court insists that the solution to the problem is pre-
ventive action at the trial level rather than curative at the appellate
level.
41 Id. at 358-63.
42 Id. at 362.
3 See Goldfarb, Public Information, Criminal Trials and the Cause
Celebre, 36 N.Y.U.L. REv. 810 (1961).
44Supra note 30, at 361.
42 For an example of such a regulation at the federal level, see 28 C.F.R.§ 50.2 (1966). This regulation prohibits the release by Justice Department
personnel of certain specified types of information concerning those charged
with crime in the federal courts.
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Another aspect of the opinion deserves attention for the
light it sheds on the substantive framework within which similar
cases will be viewed on the appellate level. Appellate tribunals
have the duty to make an independent evaluation of the circum-
stances to determine whether there is a reasonable likelihood that
prejudicial news will prevent a fair trial. 46  This appears to be a
significant diminution, in line with Rideau and Estes, of the
quantum of proof necessary to demonstrate a claim of unfair
trial. The totality of circumstances, as in Estes, may be sufficient
to accomplish this purpose even though no demonstrable or identi-
fiable instance of prejudice can be shown. Thus, the petitioner
need not prove the fact of prejudice but only a total fact setting
from which the appellate court can infer the probability or likelihood
of prejudice. This requirement alone should force trial courts
to be more perceptive and sensitive to the significance of particular
circumstances which by themselves may be insufficient to establish
the existence of prejudice, but when viewed in the totality of cir-
cumstances, may be sufficient to give rise to the probability of
prejudice. As an example, the admission by a juror of his ex-
posure to a particular prejudicial matter, together with his statement
of continued impartiality, probably would not give rise to any
doubts as to prejudice. But, when this is coupled with the fact
that a significant proportion of those examined during the jury
selection process likewise indicated exposure and reaction to such
matter, it would seem that the trial court, under Sheppard, should
be readily receptive to motions for the application of remedies such
as continuance or change of venue. Where there is doubt as to
the fact of prejudice, it would seem that Sheppard would call for
the application of measures calculated to insure that the balance
is never "weighed against the accused." 47 The main thrust of the
decision is that trial courts do possess sufficient inherent powers
to assure the non-intrusion of extraneous influences and that the
time has now arrived when these powers must be exercised fully
and effectively for the accused's benefit.
The Sheppard opinion very clearly reflects the Court's attitude
toward the essential freedoms which were apparently in conflict
in that case. The Court decisively chose a course calculated to
preserve the strength of both the right to a fair trial and the freedom
of the press. While leaving the press generally unfettered in its
task of responsibly informing the public, it took great pains
to indicate methods, consistent with such freedom, which could
nevertheless be utilized to assure each accused of a fair trial.
The emphasis upon the powers of the trial court is an answer
Supra note 30, at 362-63.
47 Id. at 362.
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to those critics-"' who have challenged the efficacy of such powers.
The answer supplied by the Court is clear: the weakness in regard
to these powers is not the weakness of the powers themselves
but the general reluctance and infrequency with which they are
employed by trial courts. The Court's position is that the solution
to the problem lies precisely in changing this situation. In this
regard, the opinion is a welcome and positive statement of judicial
concern and responsibility.
So, too, the Court's treatment of the fundamental freedom
of the press reflects its concern for what it terms the sensationalism
too often attendant upon the reporting of crime and criminal trials.
It appears that the Court, through its espousal of direct control
of the flow of information from court officers and witnesses,
recognizes that freedom of the press is not unlimited and that such
measures of control leave the press free to fulfill its function, i.e.,
to inform the public of the course and content of judicial pro-
ceedings through unvarnished accounts of those proceedings as they
develop in the courtroom. The implication is that, if the press is
acting responsibly, the trial court need take no steps to curb the
flow of information. It is to be hoped that the press will recognize
its responsibility in this area, both from self-interest and from a
regard for the integrity of judicial proceedings, and exercise such
self-restraint as is necessary to achieve the ends described by the
Court. Fortunately, there are already signs of such self-restraint,
one of which arose as a direct result of the newspaper coverage
of the Sheppard trial. 9 The Toledo Blade and The Toledo Times
have adopted a voluntary code dealing with the publication of
information regarding criminal trials. They have pledged them-
selves to limit their pretrial coverage to the following: the name,
age, and address of the accused; how, when, and where the arrest
was made; the charge and the identity of the complainant; and
that a grand jury has returned an indictment and a trial date
has been set. They have also agreed that during the course of
the case, they will not print information of the following kind:
any prior criminal record of the accused; any so-called confession
which the accused may have made, except that it will publish the
fact that the accused has made a statement; any statement made
by officials which is construed as detrimental to the accused; any
names of jurors selected for a particular trial; and, any arguments
made in court in the absence of the jury or any evidence excluded
from the jury. This is a significant indication of precisely the
kind of responsible self-restraint which the news media hopefully
will exercise. There are, of course, those members of the news
distribution industries who would be unwilling to sacrifice the
48 See generally supra note 43.
4 See N.Y. Times, Aug. 22, 1966, p. 35, col. 5.
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circulation potential of a sensational trial to the interests of re-
sponsibility and fundamental fairness. To many commentators on
the problem, this fact has been the basis upon which to call
for positive restrictions upon the press. This call for action seems,
however, to be both futile, in constitutional terms, and unnecessary
in practical terms. Where the press is unwilling to exercise such
self-restraint, the trial court is inherently able to take steps calculated
to neutralize the effects of such press activity. As the Court pointed
out in Sheppard, criticism is too ofterf mistakenly directed at the
lack of remedies available to the trial court, and all too rarely at
the real problem, i.e., the failure of courts to insist upon their
effective use whenever necessary to preserve an accused's right to
a fair trial. Where their protection is effectively employed, the problem
of a non-conforming member of the news media can be effectively
solved. M
INjUiCTIONS - FEDERAL ANTI-INJUNCTION STATUTE - PRI-
VATE PARTY HELD "ExPREssLY AUTHoRIzED" By SECURITIES Ex-
CHANGE ACT TO SEEK STAY OF STATE COURT PROCEEDINGS.-
In an action brought by a corporation, a federal court enjoined
defendant-shareholder from utilizing stockholders' authorizations
which he had solicited and obtained in violation of the Securities
and Exchange Commission proxy regulations. Defendant was
attempting to make use of these authorizations in a New York State
court proceeding in which he sought to secure inspection of the
corporation's shareholder list. On appeal, defendant contended,
inter alia, that the injunction was issued in violation of the
federal anti-injunction statute. The Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, in affirming the district court, held, that in view of
the Securities Exchange Act provisions authorizing the Commission
to bring suit to restrain violations of its regulations, injunctive
relief sought by a private party for the same purpose was within
the "expressly authorized" exception of the anti-injunction statute.
Studebaker v. Gittlin, 360 F.2d 692 (2d Cir. 1966).
With the exception of the general limitations placed on the
federal judicial power by Article III, the federal constitution
does not 'prohibit the federal courts from enjoining actions in state
courts. In 1789, the Judiciary Act granted the federal courts a
general power to issue all writs.' Shortly thereafter, however,
Congress limited this power by providing that a writ of injunction
shall not be granted "to stay proceedings in any court of a state
.2 Although the legislative history of this act is somewhat
128 US.C § 1651 (1964).
2 Act of March 2, 1793,. cli. 22, § 5, 1 Stat. 333.
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